Understanding How IMSI-Catchers Exploit Cell Networks

Very comprehensive article to understand how IMSI-Catchers Exploit Cell Networks.

You’ve probably heard of Stingrays or IMSI-catchers, which belong to the broader category of “Cell Site Simulators” (CSSs).

These devices let their operators “snoop” on the phone usage of people nearby.

There’s a lot of confusion about what CSSs are actually capable of, and different groups - from activists to policy makers to technologists - understand them differently.

It is not easy to find details of what’s going on with “IMSI-catcher” type cell network attacks. And this article try to bridge that gap, and to make accessible the technical inner workings of CSSs, or rather, the details of the kind of attacks they might rely on.

For example, what are the different kinds of location tracking attacks and how do they actually work?

Another example: it’s also widely believed that CSSs are capable of communication interception, but what are the known limits around cell network communication interception and how does that actually work?

See all details in the article: :point_down:

Hi AlexB Thanks for your information. Please tell me that when the IMSI-Catcher is acting as Machine in the Middle (MitM) between MS and the base station, it detects the device or MS model, among other information about the device. Please tell me the scenario in which it gets the MS model.

Before starting to talk about IMSI Catcher, we need to understand what is the IMSI, its importance, and its structure. Based on this, we will discuss the IMSI catcher. So let’s GO :slightly_smiling_face:

IMSI Catcher